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STATE IMMUNITY, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND ALDEN v. MAINE
William P. Marshall*
Jason S. Cowartt
I.

INTRODUCrION

In Alden v. Maine,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that
Congress could not subject nonconsenting states to private suits for
money damages in state court. The case closely followed the Court's
decision three years earlier in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,2 which held that
Congress could not subject nonconsenting states to private suits for
money damages in federal court. The two cases together thus virtually
immunize the states from private suits for damages based upon federal statutory law.3

The Alden opinion, although controversial in result, 4 was, for the
most part, unremarkable in methodology. The Court utilized the tex*

GalenJ. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School.

t Law Clerk for the Honorable Richard Alan Enslen, ChiefJudge of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The authors are grateful to
Harold Krent for his helpful comments and criticisms.
1 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
2 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
3 The one exception would appear to be private causes of action enacted by
Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
422 U.S. 445 (1976).
Neither Alden nor Seminole Tribe reached the question of whether the states are
absolutely immune from private damage suits alleging constitutional violations.
Although Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), held that states were immune from
such suits in federal court, Alden and Seminole Tribe (and Hans) leave open the possibility that states could be subject to constitutional damage claims in state court. See
infra note 50.

4 The decision provoked a strong dissent, see Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269, and has
been heavily criticized by some commentators, see, e.g., Vicki Jackson, The 1999 Trilogy: What Is Good Federalism, 31 RurcES LJ. (forthcoming 2000); David Shapiro, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereignty, Immunity and the Denationalizationof Federal Law,
31 RurGERm LJ. (forthcoming 2000).
io69
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tual, 5 historical, 6 and precedential 7 tools that it had employed in previous state immunity decisions. Intriguingly, however, in Alden the
Court incorporated a new line of analysis into its state immunity jurisprudence that it had previously applied primarily in its state sovereignty cases. 8 Borrowing from these recent state sovereignty

decisions, Alden held, in part, that Congress's attempt to subject the
states to private damage suits in enforcement of federal statutory laws
was unconstitutional because it would violate constitutional principles
of political accountability.
The significance that the Court placed on the accountability argument in Alden is not immediately apparent. First, the Court was less
5 In the case of state immunity, the better word is "non-textual." At least since
Hans the Court has not related the protection of state immunity to explicit constitutional text. The 11th Amendment, which is the textual provision that is most on point
explicitly provides only that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI.
Alden is not reached by the text of the 11th Amendment for two separate reasons.
First, Alden was brought in state court. The Eleventh Amendment by its own terms
only applies to federal courts. Second, Alden was brought by in-state citizens against
their own state. The text of the 11th Amendment addresses only state immunity from
out-of-state citizens.
For the position that the l1th Amendment should be read to mean what it says,
see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1342 (1989).
6 Both the majority and dissent relied heavily on historical materials. See Alden,
119 S. Ct. at 2247-53 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 2270-85 (Souter, J., dissenting). The conclusiveness of the historical evidence, however, is debatable. As Ann Althouse has
noted, history may be used to support a wide range of approaches to the state immunity question, and as with many other areas of constitutional law, is unlikely to provide
definitive answers. See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searchingfor a Way to
EnforceFederalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2000).
7 The majority relied upon such precedential stalwarts as Hans and Principalityof
Monaco v. Missisppi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
8 In this Essay, the term "state immunity" refers to the constitutional protections
of the state from suit, and "state sovereignty" refers to the substantive constitutional
protections of the state from federal regulation. The two issues are distinct. As Alden
indicates, a state may not enjoy substantive state sovereignty protections from federal
statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), yet it still may be entitled to
state immunity from certain suits based upon violations of that statute. See Alden, 119
S. Ct. at 2269.
For a thorough discussion of these terms, their meaning, and an overview of this
area of the Court's jurisprudence, see George Brown, State Sovereignty Underthe Burger
Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some BroaderImplications ofAtascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363 (1985), and Carlos Manuel Vfzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
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than clear in explaining how political accountability concerns specifically pertain to state immunity doctrine. 9 Second, because other rationales may also explain the Alden decision, it is unclear whether the
accountability argument was intended to stand on its own or was offered mainly to reinforce other justifications. 10 Third, as will be discussed, Alden's reluctance to take the accountability rationale to its
logical conclusion suggests that the Court itself may not be fully committed to this theory as an explanation of state immunity doctrine."
This Essay will address the political accountability argument as set
forth in Alden. Part II presents the doctrinal background. Part HA
traces the development of the political accountability rationale as it
has been applied in the Court's state sovereignty jurisprudence. Part
I.B examines the extent to which the Court has implicitly applied
accountability principles in its prior state immunity jurisprudence. In
particular, this Section will examine the "clear statement rule" and its
relationship to issues of political accountability. Part II focuses on
Alden itself. It discusses the political accountability arguments present
in the case (explicit and implicit) and evaluates the strengths and
weaknesses underlying each rationale. Finally, Part IV offers a brief
conclusion.
There is one caveat. For the purposes of this Essay, the authors
do not question the legitimacy of the political accountability rationale
as a constitutional principle. We leave that issue to others. Rather,
our focus is whether the political accountability rationale, iflegitimate,
supports the decision in Alden.

9 As will be discussed, the precise meaning of the Court's accountability argument in Alen is not free from doubt. At one point, the Court related accountability

to federally imposed judicial interference with the state's budgetary process. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265-66. At another, the Court tied accountability concerns to the
federal government's failure to bring suit against the state itself. See id. at 2267; see
also infra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
10 See William P. Marshall, UnderstandingAlden, 31 RUTGERS LJ. (forthcoming
2000) (setting forth the various rationales that may explain the Alden decision).
11 Alden does not, for example, apply the accountability rationale to bar demands
by private parties for prospective relief although that relief would presumably harn
accountability interests as well. See infra notes 57-60, 78-79 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

PoliticalAccountability and State Sovereignty

Garciaand NationalLeague of Cities

The development of the political accountability rationale begins
with Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,12 although to
understand this development one must begin with Garcia's antecedent case NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery.' 3 In NationalLeague of Cities
the Court held that the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress
to subject the states to minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).14 This decision, based upon principles of state sovereignty, concluded that the federal government was
forbidden from regulating the states in the same way that it regulated
the behavior of private individuals or corporations. 15 Rather, the
states were held to enjoy substantive protection from federal regulation in areas of "traditional governmental functions."1 6 National
League of Cities, however, proved difficult to implement as lower courts
struggled to define "traditional governmental functions." Garciaeventually overruled the decision.
Garcia abandoned the "traditional governmental functions approach" and embarked upon what initially appeared to be a complete
judicial abdication of any role in policing the lines of permissible federal regulation of the states. While acknowledging that the Constitution intended to divide power between states and the federal
government, and that the preservation of strong and autonomous
states was important to our federal system, the Court concluded that
17
state challenges to congressional actions were non-justiciable.
Rather, according to the Court, the protections of the states as states
were to be found in the structure of the federal government-a structure in which the interests of the states were amply and pervasively
represented. Under this theory, known as "process federalism," the
12 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
13 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The precise point or case in which the political accountability rationale was born is impossible to determine. However, because the theory of
process federalism, embodied in Garcia,has become the primary interpretive model
for resolving state sovereignty issues, and for the reasons explored below, we consider

Garcia to be ground zero in the Court's political accountability jurisprudence.
14 See id. at 852.
15 See id This holding was overruled Mayland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
16 NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
17 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
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protection of the states did not require judicial policing.' s As the
Court stated,
[T] he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal
Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition
of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the
States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The States were vested
with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the
Presidency by their control of electoral qualifications and their role
in Presidential elections. They were given more direct influence in
the Senate, where each State received equal representation and
each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his State.... In
short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special
restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in
the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign
interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than byjudicially created limitations on federal power. 19
The Garciadecision marked what in hindsight might be viewed as
the Court's first use of a political accountability rationale.2 0 Shifting
away from the substance-based analysis in NationalLeague, the Garcia
Court explained that because the federal government was politically
accountable to the states, there was no reason for the Court to oversee
federal decisions to regulate the states.
2.

New York v. United States

In 1992, the Court's decision in New York v. United States2 I inserted a new type of political accountability concern into the Court's
federalism jurisprudence. In New York v. United States, the Court re18 The Court's reasoning in this respect was heavily influenced by the works of
Jesse Choper and Herbert Wechsler. SeeJEssE H. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL REVImv AND TH=
NATIONAL PoLrmcAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLum. L. REv. 543, 548 (1954).
19 See Garcia,469 U.S. at 550-52.
20 The political accountability aspect of Garciawas immediately noted by one
scholar. In 1985, Professor D. Bruce La Pierre presciently argued that political accountability was the key to understanding the holding in Garcia. See D. Bruece La
Pierre, PoliticalAccountability in the National PoliticalProcess-TheAlternative to Judicial
Review of FederalismIssues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577 (1985).
21 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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viewed a challenge to the "take title" provisions of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (Amendments). 22 The
Amendments required that the states would have to take possession of
nuclear waste or enact legislation regulating the waste in accordance
with congressional instruction. The issue before the Court was
whether Congress had the power to "commandeer" the states in this
manner.
The Court held that Congress was without such power because
commandeering the states in this way unconstitutionally violated political accountability principles. The Court's discussion is notable:
[W]here the Federal Government compels the States to regulate,
the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best
interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That
view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is
contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and
it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision
turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated
23
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.
New York v. United States represented an important change in the

Court's approach to state sovereignty issues for two reasons.2 4 First, it
indicated that federal regulation of the States would, contrary to the
implication of Garcia, be subject to judicial intervention in some instances. 25 Second, it indicated that the basis for this intervention
would be a type of political accountability concern not previously dis22 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-a) (1994).
23 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168-69.
24 Although New York v. United States was the first decision to explicitly invoke the
political accountability of governments to the citizens they represented as a basis for
decision, Justice O'Connor's partial dissent in FERC v. Mississipp, 456 U.S. 742
(1982), had raised the idea previously. As she stated, "Local citizens hold their utility
commissions accountable for the choices they make.... Congressional compulsion
of state agencies, unlike pre-emption blurs the lines of political accountability and
leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local
needs." Id. at 787.
25 See Deborah Merritt, Three Faces ofFederalism:Findinga Formulafor the Future,47
VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1572 n.34 (1994) (arguing that New York v. United States is a significant rejection of Garcia's deference to process federalism).
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cussed in the Court's state sovereigntyjurisprudence. 2 6 Unlike Garcia,
which had focused on the political accountability of the federal government to the states, New York v. United States examined the lines of
political accountability running between citizens and their representative governments. On this basis, the Court found the Waste Policy
Amendments to be problematic on two counts. First, the Amendments interfered with the lines of accountability between state governments and state citizens by forcing the states to shoulder the negative
political fallout inherent in the disposition of nuclear waste. Second,
the Amendments interfered with the lines of accountability between
the federal government and the national electorate by allowing the
former to avoid its own political responsibility for unpopular decisions. These political accountability problems, explained Justice
27
O'Connor, rendered the Amendments unconstitutional.
3. Printz v. United States
In Print, the Court was again confronted with a federal statute
that ordered state officials to take certain actions. At issue in Printz
was whether interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act,2 8 which required certain local authorities to determine

whether a proposed gun sale would violate the law, were constitutional. As it had in New York v. United States, the Court struck down the
federal statute on state sovereignty grounds. Unlike New York v. United
States, however, this case involved an attempt to require state executive
officers (as opposed to state legislatures) to perform certain acts dictated by federal law. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court
held that the commandeering of state executive officers, like the com29
mandeering of state legislatures, was unconstitutional.
The Court's opinion relied upon a variety of arguments but drew
its greatest support from the lines of political accountability rationale
advanced in New York v. United States. As the Printz Court explained,
26
See id. (explaining how political accountability theory differs from process
federalism).
27 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv.
633 (1993) (examiningJustice O'Connor's theory of federalism, as embodied by her

opinion in New York v. United States and other cases, and concluding that while her
theory of political accountability does not flow naturally from the vision of federalism
held by the constitutional framers, it may be justified by more prudential concerns for
the continued autonomy of the states in an era of ever expanding federal power).

28 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2) (1994).
29 For an insightful assessment of the doctrinal ramifications of Print; and the
extent to which the decision is defensible on constitutional grounds, see Evan H.
Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalisim, 1997 Su. CT. REv. 199.
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We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivi°
sions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.3
The Printz equation was direct and to the point. The distinction
between state legislatures and state executives did not make a difference. The need to protect the lines of accountability between state
citizens and state executive officers was indistinguishable from the
need to protect the lines of accountability between state citizens and
their legislatures. Similarly, just as the federal government should not
be able to shield itself from political liability by forcing state legislatures to suffer the consequences of potentially unpopular decisions, so
too must it be prevented from forcing state executive officers to incur
political repercussions more appropriately aimed at the federal government. The Court explained that
[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress
can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And
even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects. Under the
present law, for example, it will be the [state executive officer] and
not some federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and
immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be the [state executive officer], not some federal official, who will be blamed for
any error... that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected.-'
In Printz, like New York v. United States, the Court explained that
federal commandeering diminished the political accountability of (1)
the federal government to the national electorate and (2) state governments to state citizens. According to the Court, this loss of political accountability seriously threatened the maintenance of a strong
federal system and violated basic postulates of American federalism.
B.

PoliticalAccountability and State Immunity

Accountability concerns have, prior to Alden, never been an explicit part of state immunity jurisprudence. They may, however, be
30 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
31

Id. at 930 (citations omitted).
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implicit in one comer of the Court's Eleventh Amendment case lawthe so-called "clear statement rule." The clear statement rule requires
that Congress must provide "unmistakably clear" language if it intends
to abrogate state immunity in federal court.3 2 Originally, the theoreti-

cal basis of the clear statement rule was not immediately apparent as
the Court's early decisions were largely silent about what the underlying rationale might be. Instead, the clear statement rule was simply
premised on vague ideas about the important constitutional interests
33
at stake when state immunity was abrogated.
Then, in the same year that the Court handed down its decision
in Garcia, it decided Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.3 4 Although

the decision itself was no more specific about precisely how or why the
clear statement rule worked within a broader conception of federalism,3 5 its chronological proximity to Garciaarguably placed the clear
32 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress
may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."); see
also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 251 (1989) (requiring clear language in statute
to abrogate state's 11th Amendment immunity); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987) (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, for
the proposition that Congress failed to state an "unmistakably clear expression" to
abrogate 11th Amendment immunity); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)
(stating that "Is]tates may not be sued in federal court ... unless Congress... unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity"); Quem v.Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 343 (1979) (stating that "[o]ur cases consistently have required a clearer showing
of congressional purpose to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity"); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (supporting the proposition that a waiver of state
immunity will be found only "where stated 'by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction'" (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1909))); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285
(1973) (noting that "[ilt would also be surprising in the present case to infer that
Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional immunity without... indicating in
some way by clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away").
33 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (explaining that "[o]ur reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in our federal system"); Quem, 440 U.S. at 343-44 (noting that
the "long enjoyed" status of state immunity helps to explain clear statement requirement); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 678 (noting that the constitutional status of immunity
and importance of state fiscal administration justify a clear statement rule).
34 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
35 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238-39 (explaining that "because the Eleventh
Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal
Government and the States, ... we have required an 'unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
States"'").
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statement rule in a new light.3 6 Garcia's central premise was that the

states' interests were institutionally protected by the structure of the
federal government. Clear statement requirements could be seen as
complimentary mechanisms to reinforce this understanding.3 7 Since
Congress was institutionally designed to ensure that the states' interests were conscientiously considered, it might make sense that Congress be required to clearly express its desire to overcome those
interests when it abrogated the states' sovereign immunity. 38 Seen
from this perspective, the "clear statement rule" had forced Congress
to do exactly what Garcia assumed it was designed to do-seriously
36
Atascaderois significant because it is often credited with introducing the modem day clear statement rule. See Brown, supra note 8; Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive
Jurisdictionand the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the Assumption of State CourtAvailability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1287, 1305-06 (1994); Note, Clear
Statement Rules, Federalism, and CongressionalRegulation of States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959,
1962 (1994) [hereinafter Clear Statement Rules].
For a discussion of the development of clear statement rules in the 11th Amendment context, see Cloherty, supra, at 1305-06 (examining the doctrinal basis of the
clear statement rule, suggesting that the rule may have been based on an assumption
that state courts could exercise jurisdiction over cases barred in federal court, and
suggesting that in cases involving exclusive federal jurisdiction the clear statement
rule should be relaxed), and ClearStatement Rules, supra, at 1962 (explaining extent to
which clear statement rule is consistent with the political safeguards theory of Garcia).
37 See generally HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND
PRACrcE 142 (1984).
38 See id. at 142. Fink and Tushnet state that
[t] he Wechslerian political safeguards approach to federalism justifies the
imposition of a clear statement requirement: if national legislators are to
consider states' interests effectively before overriding them in the service of a
greater national interest, they must be aware of the degree to which states'
interests are at stake. The Court can promise such awareness by forcing the
process of drafting legislation to produce proposals that signal their impact.
Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-8, at 317 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that "[t]o give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia
relied to protect states' interests"); Brown, supra note 8, at 390 (arguing that the clear
statement rule is "process [federalism] with a bite" and explaining that "[i]f Congress
is the only source of protection of the states' interests, it does not seem unfair for the
Court to force Congress to do its job"); accordVicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988) (arguing that a
clear statement requirement may be advisable even if state immunity has no constitutional component). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593
(1992) (arguing that clear statement rules are not consistent with Garcia);William P.
Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 345, 353-54 (1990) (explaining "anomalies and inconsistencies" between the clear statement rule and the premise of Garcia).
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consider the interests of the states. Clear statement rules, in short,
reflected a concern for the type of political accountability discussed in
Garcia.3 9
IL.

POLITICAL AccouNTABILn

AND ALDEN

Alden, as previously noted, explicitly cited political accountability
concerns as one of the grounds for its decision. The opinion, however, did not clearly explain how, or if, its use of the political accountability rationale related to the use of thatjustification in previous cases
(i.e., in Garcia, Atascadero, New York v. United States, and Printz). Accordingly, the meaning and derivation of political accountability as
used in Alden is not clear. This Section, therefore, will attempt to unpack and then critique the political accountability rationale as
presented in Alden.
Alden itself presented political accountability concerns in two different contexts. First, the Court examined accountability in relation
to the interference with the states' budgetary processes caused by federal authorization of private damage suits against the states.40 We will
refer to this form of accountability as "budgetary accountability." Second, the Court examined the extent to which accountability concerns
were implicated when private parties, rather than the federal govern41
ment, brought damage suits against the states to enforce federal law.
We will refer to this form of accountability as "enforcement accountability." Each will be addressed in turn.
A.

Budgetary Accountability

The first form of accountability referred to in Alden is budgetary
accountability. According to the Court,
A general federal power to authorize private suits for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern
in accordance with the will of their citizens. Today, as at the time of
the founding, the allocation of scarce resources among competing
needs and interests lies at the heart of the political process. While
the judgment creditor of the State may have a legitimate claim for
compensation, other important needs and worthwhile ends compete for access to the public fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in
39

It is interesting to note that the clear statement rule seems to flow much more

naturally from Garcia, because of the rule's relationship to the accountability of the
federal government to the states, than does the Court's anti-commandeering rule in
New York and Printz, which concerns the relationship of the states and the federal
government to their respective electorates.
40

See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265-66.

41

See id. at 2267.
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full, it is inevitable that difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and political of judgments must be made. If the principle of
representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the State,
not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and
invoked by the private citizen. "It needs no argument to show that
the political power cannot be thus ousted of its jurisdiction and the
42
judiciary set in its place."
Budgetary accountability, as articulated in Alden, arguably follows
from the political accountability issues raised in New York v. United
States and Printz because it concerns the lines of accountability between the state and its citizens. 4 3 In New York v. United States, for example, the Court was concerned with the ability of state officials to
legislate according to the will of their constituents when the federal
government ordered the state to regulate notwithstanding that popular will.44 Similarly, in Printz, the Court was concerned with the effect
that forcing state executive officials to enforce federal law would have
on the accountability of those officials to their constituents. 45 The
concern for state budgetary accountability concerns, like the accountability discussed in New York and Printz, is grounded in the belief that
it is constitutionally necessary to ensure that state governments are not
forced to take responsibility for unpopular policy decisions not of
46
their own making.
As applied to state immunity in Alden, the budgetary accountability rationale has some explanatory force. First, the Court's connection
between the allocation of scarce resources in budgetary decisionmak42 Id.at 2264-65 (citing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883)).
43 Interestingly, the Court cites Printzbut does not cite New York v. United States in
this section of the opinion although it is the accountability of state legislatures rather
than state executive officers which is presumably harmed by federal interference with
the state's budgetary process.
44 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
45 See Printz v.United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (noting that state executive officials would be unfairly blamed by their constituents for the cost and defects of
the federal policy if they were forced to enforce it).
46 Although raised in the litigation, Alden did not relate the anti-commandeering
rule of New York v. United States and Printz to the federal government's enlisting state
courts to enforce federal statutory rights. This is actually not surprising. Pfintz has
foreshadowed this result by suggesting, in dicta, that anti-commandeering principles
did not apply to the required enforcement of federal rights by state courts because of
the State Judges Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.

2; Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-34. For a critique of this issue, see Martin H. Redish &
Steven G. Sklaver, FederalPower to Commandeer State Courts: Implicationsfor the Theory of
JudicialFederalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 71 (1998).
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ing, and the "essence" or "heart" of state sovereignty, helps to explain
why state immunity doctrine has generally been tied to the protection
of state treasuries. 47 As such, the justification provides a unifying theory for state immunity cases. 4s
Second, the budgetary accountability concern provides a direct
link between Alden and Seminole Tribe. After all, if the key question is
whether the federal government can interfere with the states' budgetary processes by authorizing private suits against the states for money
damages, it makes no difference whether the private suit takes place
in state or federal court. Budgetary accountability thus offers an answer to those who would otherwise argue that there is a lesser intrusion on the states in subjecting them to suits in their own courts, as
opposed to suits in federal court.4 9 From the perspective of budgetary
accountability, the intrusion is the same.50
47 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890); see also William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
CriticalEvaluation, 102 HARv. L. Ray. 1372, 1396 (1989).
48 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651 (setting forth the retospective-prospective relief
distinction that pervades state immunity jurisprudence). The tying of budgetary accountability to government immunity may also explain federal sovereign immunity,
which like state sovereign immunity has also been interpreted to apply only to suits
for damage relief. Compare Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), with Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
49 See generally Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
result); Jackson, supra note 4; Shapiro, supra note 4.
50 The Alden Court's concern with budgetary accountability may be even broader
than a limited concern for budgetary interference that occurs at the behest of the
federal government. In one passage the Court suggests that budgetary accountability
concerns are raised any time courts become involved in the budgetary process. As the
Court states,
The asserted authority would blur not only the distinct responsibilities of the
State and National Governments but also the separate duties of the judicial
and political branches of the state governments, displacing "state decisions
that 'go to the heart of representative government.'" A State is entitled to
order the processes of its own governance, assigning to the political
branches, rather than the courts, the responsibility for directing the payment of debts.... If Congress could displace a State's allocation of governmental power and responsibility, the judicial branch of the State, whose
legitimacy derives from fidelity to the law, would be compelled to assume a
role not only foreign to its experience but beyond its competence as defined
by the very constitution from which its existence derives.
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2265 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)).
This broad reading of the accountability rationale may be significant. If this reflects the Court's position on the issue, it would suggest that States may be immune in
state courts from private suits for damages brought for constitutional violations-an
issue left open in Alden. After all, if the problem to be avoided isjudicial interference
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Nevertheless, the Court's reliance on the budgetary accountability rationale in Alden is surprising on a number of counts. First, the
budgetary accountability concern was not raised in Seminole Tribe. An
immediate question, therefore, is whether its use in Alden is truly an
explanatory theory or is only an offer of a makeweight.
Second, and more importantly, the budgetary accountability theory as presented in Alden fails on its own terms. There are simply too
many ways remaining after Alden through which the state fisc may be
invaded to suggest that budgetary accountability is the governing rationale. Alden, for example, explicitly approved of suits for damages
brought against the states by the federal government.5 1 Such actions
not only invade state treasuries, because the federal government is authorized to collect damages on behalf of individuals, 52 they also cost
the states the very same amount as actions brought by private parties.
Alden does not even foreclose all private damage suits affecting
state treasuries. Private suits against the states for damages may be
available in sister state courts.5 3 Damage suits may also be brought in
federal court or in a state's own court if based on a statutory right duly
created under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 4 Finally,
state treasuries may be indirectly affected by private suits of state of55
ficers and political subdivisions.
with the budgetary process, then it would make no difference whether the source of

the interference was the constitution or federal statutory law. Indeed, this broad
reading of budgetary accountability in Alden would also implicate the Court's decision
in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (holding that states are not immune from

private damage suits in sister state courts). Ifjudicial interference with the state budgetary process is really the evil to be prevented, this concern should also apply with
equal force to private suits brought in sister state courts.
For an argument that Alden stands for the proposition that the states must enforce private damage suits for federal constitutional violations against itself, see
Michael Wells, Suing States for Money in the State Courts: ConstitutionalRemedies After
Alden and Florida Prepaid, 31 RuTGERS L.J (forthcoming 2000).
51
See Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2267.
52 See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 188 (1936) (holding that Califor-

nia was subject to suit in federal district court for violations of the Safety Appliance
Act and liable to the United States for resulting penalties); see alsoJonathan R. Siegel,
The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEx. L. REV.

539, 552 (1995) (arguing that the federal government can sue the states and award
any damage award to private citizens).
53

See Hall, 440 U.S. at 410.

54 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
55 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (stating that state officers may be
subject to suits for damages and cities and/or political subdivisions are also not protected from damage remedies); see also Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
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The road for private individuals to the state treasury, moreover,
does not even end here. Private injunctive actions against the states
available under the doctrine of Ex parte Young 56 also interfere with
state budgets. Compliance with affirmative injunctions may require
the states to expend significantly more funds than would many, if not
most, suits for retrospective relief.57 Negative injunctions also impose
substantial costs. Consider, for example, the cases of patent and
trademark infringements addressed in Alden's companion cases, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank58 and College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board.59 Although FloridaPrepaidand College Savings Bank
held that the states could not be subject to damage actions for patent
and trademark violations, they did not prevent injunctive suits to enforce these rights. Such suits, however, may impose substantial costs
upon the states by requiring them to pay license fees or other such
costs if the states chose to continue the patent or trademark uses. Finally, injunctive actions impose liability upon the states for "ancillary"
costs such as attorneys' fees. 60 Ancillary awards, needless to say, also
obviously drain state resources.
There is no question, in short, that the limited protection of the
state's fisc offered in Alden and Seminole Tribe will not effectively insulate the states' budgetary processes from federal statutory claims.
6
Budgetary accountability does not explain state immunity law. '
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Melvyn Durchslag, Should Political
Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity 2, 43 DEPAuL L. REV. 577 (1994).
When state officers or state subdivisions are forced to pay private damage awards,
state treasuries are affected because many, if not most, states indemnify their officers
and/or assume some of the costs of municipalities. See, e.g., GA. CoNSr., art Il, § 5
(1983); CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 16649.92 (West 1995); 5 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 350/2 (West
1999); OIo REv. CODE ANN § 9.87 (Anderson 1999);John C.Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof
the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 50 (1998) (discussing states
routinely indemnifying state officers).

56 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
57 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (suggesting that compliance with
affirmative injunction may require significant expenditures of state resources without
violating principles of state immunity).
58 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).

59

119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).

60 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding that attorneys fees may be
awarded against the states without violating state immunity protections).
61 The Court may be suggesting that interference with the state budget would
offend constitutionally based accountability concerns unless that interference occurs
as a result of the direct interference of the federal government, i.e., the federal government itself brings the suit. This rationale assumes that federal government enforcement against the states will be more sympathetic to state budgetary concerns
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Enforcement Accountability

The second form of accountability addressed in Alden is "enforcement accountability." According to the Court, requiring the federal
government, rather than private individuals, to sue the states for damages would promote accountability concerns by assuring that the decision to sue was informed by responsible political judgment. As the
Court explained,
A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the
name of the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"
differs in kind from the suit of an individual ....
Suits brought by
the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent
from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting
States. 62
Enforcement accountability as a rationale for state immunity has
some appeal. First, like the budgetary accountability rationale, enforcement accountability also provides a common doctrinal denominator for both Alden and Seminole Tribe. To the extent that the Court
is concerned about the federal government's refusal to appropriately
consider and bear the financial burden of federal statutory enforcement actions against the state-this concern is equally implicated re63
gardless of whether the suit is brought in state or federal court.
Second, as a matter of pure theory, the rationale appears to tie
together both strands of political accountability previously discussed.
Enforcement accountability draws equally from the lines of political
accountability rationale present in New York v. United States and Printz
and the ideas about federal accountability to the states that underlie
64
Garciaand the clear statement rule.
Enforcement accountability is derivative of the lines of authority
rationale because it, like the anti-commandeering rule, examines the
than would a private litigant. If this is indeed the meaning underlying this version of
accountability, then budgetary accountability concerns are supported by the same
policies that underlie the enforcement accountability rationale to be discussed in the
Section that follows.
62 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted).
63 Of course, also like budgetary accountability, the strength of this rationale is
diminished in that it was not mentioned in the Seminole Tribe opinion.
64 The Court does not identify the theoretical basis of its enforcement accountability argument. In fact, while the Alden opinion cites New York v. United States, Printz,

and Garcia elsewhere for general propositions relating to federalism and the sovereign status of the states, it does not refer to any of these decisions in its discussion of
why federal statutory damage claims must be brought by the United States.
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extent to which the federal government is accountable to the national
electorate for its actions. By requiring the federal government to sue
the states directly, as opposed to allowing private parties to bring suit,
the Alden decision has the same effect as New York v. United States and
Printz-it forces the federal government to bear the political and financial costs of federal policy choices and enforcement. 65 Recall that
in PrintzJustice Scalia explained that "[bly forcing the state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving'
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes." 66 Similarly, if the federal government
authorizes private citizens to sue the states to enforce federal law, it
avoids accountability to the national electorate for the way the law is
67
enforced.
The enforcement accountability rationale also resonates in the
accountability theory that underlies Garcia and the clear statement
nile. Alden focused on the fact that "[s]uits brought by the United
States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit
prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad
delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States. ' 68 This
passage harkens back to Garcia's assumption that the design of the
65 See HaroldJ. Krent, Fragmentingthe UnitaryExecutive: CongressionalDelegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 74-76
(1990) (arguing that the importance of executive enforcement of federal law lies, in
part, in the fact that the executive is uniquely accountable for its actions whereas nonexecutive enforcement is not subject to any type of electoral accountability); HaroldJ.
Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MIcH. L.REv.
1793, 1799, 1803-04 (1993) (observing that suits by the executive branch, as opposed
to private suits to enforce federal law, have a variety of benefits including: promotion
of accountability by ensuring an avenue of political redress; minimization of the potential for self-interested behavior, ensured coordination and centralization over matters of importance to the public at large; and the ability to take overriding policy
considerations into account).
66 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
67 See La Pierre, supra note 20, at 642 (observing that the federal government is
only accountable to the national electorate if it is forced to bear the financial and
administrative costs of its decisions because these costs must be passed on through
higher taxes).
This argument is problematic, however, because it may prove too much. If the
federal government is less politically accountable to the national electorate when it
uses private citizens to enforce federal law, this would seem to be equally true regardless of whether a state, or some other entity, is the defendant. The best, and perhaps
only, response to this criticism is that political accountability is only relevant when
considering issues of federalism and the interrelationship between federal and state
power.
68 Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2267.
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federal government protects the states' interests. While Garcia itself
discussed the states' ability to influence pending legislation, 69 this passage in Alden implies that the design of the federal government also
protects the states' interests when federal legislation is enforced
against the states.
Third, apart from its theoretical foundations, the enforcement rationale also has practical merit. The states' interests will be better protected if the United States must bring damage claims against the states
rather than authorizing individuals to bring private claims. To begin
with, the United States can be expected to engage in more nuanced
enforcement than would private parties. 70 First, the states and the
federal government have ongoing mutually interdependent relationships that would counsel against federal authorities antagonizing their
state counterparts. 7 1 Second, federal enforcement, in any event, is
likely to be undertaken with long-term goals in mind and these goals
may not include a desire to maximize monetary damages in every
case. 72 Third, the states are likely to have political channels open to
them that may place pressure on the federal executive even when the
executive may be initially inclined to aggressively proceed against the
state. 73 In contrast, when the federal government empowers private
citizens to sue the states, these advantages are lost. Private individuals
have no incentive for any result other than the maximization of their
own damage awards.74 Their focus, quite justifiably, will not be on the
long-term interests of federal enforcement nor on the legitimate gov75
erning interests of the states.
Nevertheless, while the enforcement accountability rationale is
somewhat attractive, on both theoretical and practical grounds, it
does have limitations. To begin with, application of the enforcement
69
70

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985).
See generally Barry Friedman, When RightsEncounterReality: EnforcingFederalRem-

edies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 770 (1992) (noting that prospective remedial decrees are
often the product of negotiation among the parties and that courts work to accommodate the needs of both parties).
71 See Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VA, m. L. REV. 1485 (1994) (noting that formal and informal relationships between federal and state officials ensures
that each level is concerned about, and dependent upon, the other).
72 See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 65, at 1803-04.
73 See generally Kramer, supra note 71.
74 See id. at 1808 (explaining that private parties have self-interested reasons for
bringing suit).
75 See generally Dean J. Spader, Immunity v. Liability and the Clash of Fundamental
Values: Ancient Mysteries rying Out for Understanding,1985 CHx.-KENr L. REV. 61, 79
(noting that sovereign immunity can be viewed as a protective device created to protect governments from "insensitive citizen demands").
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accountability theory to state immunity cases actually results in triple
accountability. The first layer of accountability is created by Garcia's
suggestion that the federal government is institutionally accountable
to the states, and that it will regulate the states with the states' interests
in mind. The second layer of accountability is established by the clear
statement rule which ensures that Congress seriously considers the
states' interests before abrogating state immunity. The third layer, added by Alden, is the requirement that only federal enforcement agents
may bring suits against the states so that the states' interests are considered in enforcement actions.
Arguably this is overkill. The advantages to the states of forcing
the federal government to bring enforcement actions itself, as noted
previously, are significant.7 6 But there is no reason why Congress
should not be able to consider these advantages itself when it decides
whether or not to subject the states to private damage claims. 77 The
litigation benefits to the states of federal enforcement, after all, hardly
seem the stuff of constitutional entitlement.
More significantly, the enforcement accountability rationale, like
the budgetary accountability rationale, is inconsistent with the Court's
78
continued adherence to the prospective/retrospective distinction.
Simply stated, from the perspective of enforcement accountability,
prospective and retrospective claims against the states are indistinguishable. Both types of suits allow the federal government to avoid
political accountability to the national electorate, because in both instances the federal government is allowed to avoid the political or financial costs of enforcement. Furthermore, both types of suits allow
the federal government to avoid accountability to the states, because
in both instances the states are denied the value of whatever institutional protections might protect their interests if the federal govern79
ment were forced to bring suit.

76

See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.

77 One potential justification of triple accountability may be that Garciaand the
clear statement rule do not sufficiently protect the states, and therefore additional
safeguards like executive enforcement may be required. See Althouse, supra note 6
(observing that if Garcia really worked, Congress should have decided on its own to

require executive enforcement).
78 For a discussion of the logic and fallacies of the retrospective/prospective distinction, see Carlos Manual Vizquez, Night and Day: Couer d'Alene, Breard, and the

Unraveling of the Prospective-RetrospectiveDistinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87
GEO. L.J. 1 (1998).
79 In other contexts, the prospective/retrospective distinction has been explained on the grounds that prospective suits are more important to the federal inter-

est because they ensure that states will follow federal law in the future, whereas
retrospective suits only compensate a single individual for a harm suffered in the past.
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Indeed, the force of the enforcement accountability rationale
seems particularly undermined by the Court's endorsement of private
prospective suits. Unlike private retrospective suits, which ask a court
to award a single payment from the state treasury, private prospective
suits ask a court to enjoin the state from implementing its own policy
decisions. While the former causes a one-time drain on state resources and risks the possibility that other legislative choices may be
affected in the future, the latter will have an ongoing and definite
effect on the state's ability to make independent policy choices. Given
that the enforcement accountability rationale is concerned with the
extent to which the states, and the national electorate, can hold the
federal government accountable for enforcement decisions affecting
the states, this rationale would seem especially implicated by prospective suits because of the substantial interference they can cause in state
decisionmaking. Enforcement accountability, like budgetary accountability, is unable to explain immunity law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

State immunity jurisprudence is not generally known for its great
legal craftsmanship.8 0 After all, the first case in this area, Chisholm v.
Georgia,81 triggered a constitutional amendment.8 2 The two foundational decisions underlying current state immunity law-Hans v. Louisiana8 3 and Ex parte Young 84 -in turn rest upon logic and reasoning
that only Franz Kafka could love. 8 5 With this background in mind, it
See Althouse, supra note 77, at 1143 n.83. While there may be a sound reason
(outside of political accountability) for the distinction which the Court has drawn, the
point here is that the enforcement accountability rationale does not contain within it
any principled basis for distinguishing between prospective and retrospective relief.
Therefore, this rationale cannot serve to unify or justify the broader jurisprudence of
state immunity law.
80 Where else, for example, do justices assert that they will not follow stare decisis
in one case because the majority of the Court refused to follow precedent in a previous decision? See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
82 See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934) (stating that
Chisholm created "such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once
proposed and adopted").
83 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
84 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
85 See generally FRANz KAmcA, TiH TRIAL (1969). Hans held that states were immune from suits brought by their own citizens in federal court although the text of
the 11th Amendment only prohibits suits against states by out-of-state citizens. Hans
never made clear whether the basis of this holding was (a) the l1th Amendment,
(b) Article III, (c) sovereign immunity, (d) other, or (e) all of the above.
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is difficult not to welcome any decision which purports to introduce a
new clarifying element into state immunity analysis.
Aden was such a case. The Alden Court attempted more than just
reworking old arguments into a new context-an enterprise that accurately describes most state immunity cases. Rather, the Court attempted to infuse the state immunity discussion with a new analytic
tool-political accountability.
The Court's use of the political accountability rationale was creative as well as original. The Court integrated two separate strands of
political accountability theory into its immunity analysis. Borrowing
from recent state sovereignty cases, the Court questioned whether
subjecting states to suits in state court would interfere with the lines of
political accountability running from the electors to the elected, especially in relation to matters of state budgeting. Additionally, the Court
reinvigorated themes present in Garcia, and the clear statement decisions, and suggested that subjecting states to suit in state court might
also undermine the federal government's political accountability to
the states.
The Court's reliance on the political accountability rationale in
the context of state immunity, moreover, reflected serious practical
and policy considerations. The federal government's authorization of
private suits for damages against the states can interfere with the
state's budgetary allocations in ways that limit the ability of elected
state representatives to serve their constituents. Similarly, significant
political protections for the states are lost when enforcement actions
are brought by individuals with only monetary motives, rather than by
the United States with whom the states have a longstanding and mutually interdependent relationship.
The promise of political accountability theory as a governing explanation of state immunity, however, proved to be illusory. Although
political accountability concerns could be used to justify state immunity, there would be a significant price to pay for that approach. Most
importantly, the Court would have to abandon the prospective/retrospective distinction that pervades state immunity law because the logic
of the political accountability theory does not allow for this distincYoung, in turn, ruled that a state officer enforcing state law is not the state when
sued for injunctive relief but left intact the rule that a state officer may be considered

the state when sued for damages. The Court has applied this rule in cases where the
official action triggering the claims for injunctive and monetary relief is the same thus
leading to the schizophrenic result that a state officer defendant may be deemed both
the state, and not the state, in the very same action. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974).
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tion. The Court, undoubtedly for the better,8 6 refused to pursue this
tact.
The failure of the Court to fully implement the political accountability rationale into the state immunity context suggests that the approach may not work as a truly independent justification. Rather, it
may, in the end, serve only as a re-justification of existing doctrine.
Alden, in short, has not moved state immunity doctrine forward. It has
merely provided new terms for an old debate.

86 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983) (noting
that "the doctrine of Ex Parte Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law"), cited in ERWIN CHEMNRNSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDIaFION 413 (3d ed. 1999).

